Ein „truth teller sentence" (kurz: TT) ist ein Satz, der seine eigene Wahrheit behauptet. Bei der lebhaften Diskussion über die Wahrheitstheorie für Systeme, in denen die Lügnerparadoxie darstellbar ist, sind auch selbstreferentielle Sätze der Form eines TT intensiver untersucht worden. In der Regel wurden sie „symmetrisch" aufgefaßt: Wahrheits- und Falschheitsannahmen für einen TT schienen gleichermaßen (und aus völlig analogen Gründen) akzeptabel oder inakzeptabel. Die metatheoretischen Einsichten über TTs waren in gängigen paradoxietheoretischen Systemen jedoch nicht objektsprachlich darstellbar. Eine quotations- und reflexionslogische (...) Analyse ertaubt eine derartige objektsprachliche Repräsentation der Semantik von TTs und führt zu einer asymmetrischen Auffassung vom TT: der TT behauptet etwas (schließlich) Falsches. (shrink)

Preventive solutions for the paradoxes lead to the inexpressability of the adequacy conditions for the representation of truth within the system. Davidsonian theories of truth presuppose an understood language (for the background theory) which should permit the expression of the solutional principles for the paradoxes. The suitability of languages for this aim is tested by inferential validity paradoxes. They necessitate the introduction of an inner and an outer truthpredicate. For the paradoxes, two different types of circularity, often wrongly identified, have (...) to be distinguished. For Davidsonian theories of truth, non-two-valuedness, different versions of convention T and "principled openess" of the background theory have to be postulated. (shrink)

Preventive solutions for the paradoxes lead to the inexpressability of the adequacy conditions for the representation of truth within the system. Davidsonian theories of truth presuppose an understood language (for the background theory) which should permit the expression of the solutional principles for the paradoxes. The suitability of languages for this aim is tested by inferential validity paradoxes. They necessitate the introduction of an inner and an outer truthpredicate. For the paradoxes, two different types of circularity, often wrongly identified, have (...) to be distinguished. For Davidsonian theories of truth, non-two-valuedness, different versions of convention T and "principled openess" of the background theory have to be postulated. (shrink)

Ein „truth teller sentence" (kurz: TT) ist ein Satz, der seine eigene Wahrheit behauptet. Bei der lebhaften Diskussion über die Wahrheitstheorie für Systeme, in denen die Lügnerparadoxie darstellbar ist, sind auch selbstreferentielle Sätze der Form eines TT intensiver untersucht worden. In der Regel wurden sie „symmetrisch" aufgefaßt: Wahrheits- und Falschheitsannahmen für einen TT schienen gleichermaßen (und aus völlig analogen Gründen) akzeptabel oder inakzeptabel. Die metatheoretischen Einsichten über TTs waren in gängigen paradoxietheoretischen Systemen jedoch nicht objektsprachlich darstellbar. Eine quotations- und reflexionslogische (...) Analyse ertaubt eine derartige objektsprachliche Repräsentation der Semantik von TTs und führt zu einer asymmetrischen Auffassung vom TT: der TT behauptet etwas (schließlich) Falsches. (shrink)

We deal with five aspects of the intrinsic connection of logic, ethics, and aesthetics in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: (a) the indication of what Wittgenstein called the "higher" of the world and language; (b) the conveyance of values through an intuition "sub specie aeternitatis"; (c) the discussion of internal properties of volitional totalities; (d) the reference to the metaphysical subject as the subject of volition (the will) (e) the indication of a "happy life". This intrinsic connection supplements the idea of the transcendental (...) unity of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, and goes beyond it. (shrink)

In this chapter, we recount some of the most pressing objections to character scepticism, pointing out their limitations and, when appropriate, incorporating their suggestions. From here, we consider what empirically informed moral improvement might look like by turning to the skill analogy. While the skill analogy provides a realistic rubric for becoming a better person, many of the questions concerning the details of how moral improvement might take place remain unanswered. When developing expertise in domains like chess and morality, a (...) wide range of factors will likely be important and it is unlikely than any one individual factor will be especially important. Given this, for any account of moral improvement, our optimism should be bounded: the effect of any particular intervention is likely to be limited, in both magnitude and domain. Lastly, we consider how character scepticism has reshaped the way we think about moral responsibility, whether this is cashed out in reasons-responsiveness or self-expression accounts. While both views face challenges, by distinguishing the possession of the responsibility-making feature from failures to manifest that property in behaviour, we gain a certain degree of wiggle room that allows us to accommodate empirical findings while holding on to notions of responsibility. This chapter highlights that the ‘person-situationism debate’ has expanded far beyond its beginnings, giving way to new accounts of moral improvement and moral responsibility. (shrink)

Analysis of quantifiers in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. A critical survey In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein distinguishes between what can and cannot be said in any language by the general form of propositions. I explain Wittgenstein's method and discuss Robert J. Fogelin's criticism of what he takes to be the incompleteness of Wittgenstein's general form of propositions in his exposition of the 'Naive Constructivism of the Tractatus.' I argue that Fogelin's objection is mistaken, and that, contrary to Fogelin's claim, Wittgenstein's method when (...) properly applied produces all of the well-formed formulas with mixed multiple quantification that Fogelin maintains it cannot provide. I conclude by offering a critical comparison of similar solutions proposed, among others, by P.T. Geach, Scott Soames, and Matthias Varga von Kibéd. (shrink)

Non-verbal enrichment in the form of pictures or gesture can support word learning in first and foreign languages. The present study seeks to compare the effects of viewing pictures vs. imitating iconic gestures on learning second language (L2) vocabulary. In our study participants learned L2 words (nouns, verbs, and adjectives) together with a virtual, pedagogical agent. The to-be-learned items were either (i) enriched with pictures, or (ii) with gestures that had to be imitated, or (iii) without any non-verbal enrichment as (...) control. Results showed that gesture imitation was particularly supportive for learning nouns, whereas pictures showed to be most beneficial for memorizing verbs. These findings, suggesting that the type of vocabulary learning strategy has to match with the type of linguistic material to be learned, have important educational implications for L2 classrooms and technology-enhanced tutoring systems. (shrink)

The current study examined the effects of an intervention aimed at blocking the transfer of frustration from a previous experience (i.e. recall task) to a subsequent and unrelated task (i.e. ultimatum bargaining task). Participants who went through the intervention were more likely to accept unfair offers in the ultimatum bargaining task than those who did not go through the intervention. These results show that participants who were blocked from transferring their feelings of frustration from the recall task to the subsequent (...) bargaining task (no-transfer condition) more likely accepted unfair offers than those who inadvertently transferred their feelings of frustration (transfer condition). The effect of conditions on accept-reject decisions in the ultimatum bargaining was mediated by reported feelings of frustration. (shrink)

_Zettel, _ an en face bilingual edition, collects fragments from Wittgenstein's work between 1929 and 1948 on issues of the mind, mathematics, and language.